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Streszczenie
Współcześnie, gdy zdyskredytowana doktryna neoliberalna przestała pełnić funkcję 
dominującego wzorca polityki ekonomicznej oraz modelu systemowego, być może nad-
szedł moment wielkiego powrotu polityki przemysłowej, rozumianej jako interwencje 
państwa mające za cel stymulowanie rozwoju. W II połowie XX w. to właśnie polityka 
przemysłowa prowadzona w państwach Azji Wschodniej przyniosła najbardziej spek-
takularny rozwój. W literaturze przedmiotu sukces ten – zwany wschodnioazjatyckim 
cudem – wyjaśniany jest na gruncie koncepcji developmental state (państwa rozwojowego, 
czy też prorozwojowego).
W niniejszym artykule Autor omawia główne kierunki polityki przemysłowej państw 
Azji Wschodniej. Stawia też pytanie, czy takie podejście może być stosowane współcze-
śnie. Wymaga to wyjaśnienia, dlaczego polityka przemysłowa zyskuje na popularności. 
Następnie Autor omawia dzieje powstania pojęcia państwa rozwojowego, aby przejść do 
analizy najważniejszych jego elementów, tj. przede wszystkim strategii naśladownictwa 
i innowacji, wybierania gałęzi przemysłu, w które należy inwestować, polityki handlowej 
oraz wykorzystania subsydiów. W konkluzji stwierdza, że chociaż koncepcja developmental 
state uznawana jest za zjawisko historyczne, to zasady, którymi kierowały się państwa Azji 
Wschodniej w swojej polityce przemysłowej, nadal mogą być z powodzeniem stosowane 
w innych częściach świata.
Słowa kluczowe: rozwój gospodarczy, neoliberalizm, polityka przemysłowa, developmental 
state
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The East Asian industrial policy: a critical 
analysis of the developmental state
Abstract
In the times of discrediting neo-liberalism as the preferred guiding doctrine in economic 
policy and systemic arrangements, the industrial policy, understood as a set of state 
interventions to supervise the process of developmental advancements, may come back 
to the fore as a favoured instrument. It is the East Asian industrial policy which brought 
by far the most spectacular developmental results in the second half of the twentieth 
century. In the scholarly literature on the so-called East Asian miracle, this success is 
explained by the concept of the developmental state.
This paper examines the main threads of the East Asian industrial policy and tackles the 
issue of its contemporary applicability. It starts with the explanation as to why industrial 
policy as such is becoming more popular. It then examines the history of the formation of 
the concept of the developmental state. It analyses its most important elements, mainly, 
the strategy of imitating and innovating, the targeting of industrial sectors for develop-
ment, the trade policy and the utilisation of subsidies. In conclusion, it is claimed that 
the provisions of the East Asian industrial policy may well be employed contemporarily, 
despite the fact that the concept of developmental state is primarily seen as a historical 
phenomenon.
Keywords: economic development, neoliberalism, industrial policy
The crisis and the alternative
Most of the very recent economics related literature deals with the causes and 
consequences of the global financial crisis 2008/20091. A financial crisis is, as it 
seems, an inevitable element of the socio-economic landscape of the contemporary 
world. Only in the last two decades there have been several, for example, the 1997 
financial crisis, which extensively affected the economies of East Asia2. However, the 
1 See, for example, Financial Institutions and Markets: The Financial Crisis – An Early Retrospective, 
eds. R. R. Bliss, G. G. Kaufman, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2010; G. Cooper, The Origin of Financial 
Crises: Central Banks, Credit Bubbles and the Efficient Market Fallacy, Harriman House Ltd., Petersfield 
2008; J. B. Foster, R. W. McChesney, The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagna-
tion and Upheaval from the USA to China, “Monthly Review Press”, New York 2012.
2 See, for example, M. Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implica-
tions, “Policy Analyses in International Economics” 1998, Institute for International Economics, p. 55; 
S. Haggard, The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis, eds. L. R. Klein, T. Shabbir, Institute for 
International Economics, Washington DC 2000; Recent Financial Crises: Analyses, Challenges and Impli-
cations, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2006.
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recent financial crisis in some industrial nations, which became a global economic 
crisis3 dubbed the Great Recession4, has been particularly painful, to the extent that 
it has often been compared with the Great Depression of 1930. Various aspects and 
different stages of this crisis have been given attention in numerous analyses. In its 
extensive 650-page report entitled Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Anatomy 
of a Financial Collapse5, the US Senate cites regulatory failures as one of the reasons 
for the global economic crisis. A lack of regulation explicitly and inadequate state 
supervision implicitly are blamed for the havoc. Therefore, The Stiglitz Report suggests 
the restoration of the state as the appropriate regulator. It emphasises that ‘the crisis 
has exposed fundamental problems, not only in national regulatory systems affecting 
finance, competition and corporate governance, but also in the international institu-
tions and arrangements created to ensure financial and economic stability’6. Many 
call for more explicit state interventionism. Scott states that ‘the essential lesson of the 
last 30 years is that self – regulation of capitalism is an ideological fig leaf that hides 
a superficial understanding of a system that requires the coercive powers of govern-
ment to restrain the competitive urges of many of its leading players’7. Griffith-Jones 
et al. declare that it is time for “a visible hand” in the market8. Giddens calls outright 
for the return of some sort of planning9. Chang underlines that the ‘government 
needs to become bigger and more active’10, especially in developing countries, who 
are particularly disadvantaged, as far as the effects of economic crises are concerned.
This brings us to the question of possible development models, which would 
perhaps employ the above mentioned principles and could effectively contribute 
to the narrowing of the developmental gap between the high income economies 
and those underdeveloped countries who hold the ambition to catch up. As we wit-
ness the collapse of the neo-liberal doctrine as allegedly the universal panacea for 
3 J. E. Stiglitz, The Stiglitz Report: Reforming the International Monetary and Financial Systems in the 
Wake of the Global Crisis, The New Press, New York–London 2010.
4 R. W. Kolb, The Financial Crisis of Our Time, Oxford University Press, New York 2011; G. Chacko, 
C. L. Evans, H. Gunawan, A. Sjoman, The Global Economic System: How Liquidity Shocks Affect Financial 
Institutions and Lead to Economic Crises, FT Press, New Jersey 2011.
5 C. Levin, T. Coburn, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, 
Majority and Minority Staff Report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, United States Senate, 
13th April 2011.
6 J. E. Stiglitz, op.cit., p. 1. See also: J. P. Joyce, The IMF and Global Financial Crises: Phoenix Rising?, 
Cambridge University Press, New York 2013.
7 B. R. Scott, Capitalism: Its Origins and Evolution as a System of Governance, Springer, New York 
2011, p. 611.
8 Time for A Visible Hand: Lessons from the 2008 World Financial Crisis, eds. S. Griffith-Jones, 
J. A. Ocampo, J. E. Stiglitz, Oxford University Press, New York 2010.
9 A. Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, Polity Press, Cambridge 2009.
10 H.-J. Chang, 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism, Penguin Books, London 2010, p. 337.
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persistent underdevelopment, inevitably, the concept of the developmental state (DS) 
is resurfacing as the historically most convincing empirical example.
The concept is widely believed to be the conceptual background of state policies 
and state institutional arrangements, leading to the unprecedented developmental 
achievements among the so-called late developers of the Asian continent. Countries 
such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan became developed nations within a short period 
of time in the second half of the twentieth century. Especially remarkable is the case 
of Korea, who’s GDP per capita in the 1950 s was comparable to some impoverished 
post-colonial states in sub-Saharan Africa and now it is a modern, high income 
economy. Nonetheless, the concept is often portrayed as only a historically justifiable 
phenomenon which cannot relate to contemporary conditions.
This paper thoroughly examines the principles of the developmental state. It 
starts with some historical background. It then proceeds with the examination of 
the perceptions concerning East Asian industrial policies. It subsequently analyses 
the DS concept by examining the industrial development through learning and in-
novating and through sectoral targeting. It also describes the trade-related policies 
and subsidies as financial sector-related interventions into the market. The examina-
tions compare the two largest DS economies; Japan and (South) Korea, during their 
high growth periods11. Finally, it considers the model’s contemporary applicability.
The history
It is sometimes forgotten that the first meaningful criticism of Adam Smith’s 
classical economy’s theory of natural liberty did not come from Karl Marx. In the 
first half of the nineteenth century, a German economist Friedrich List in his study 
entitled The National System of Political Economy suggested that Smith’s ideas would 
bring benefits to more affluent countries and leave the less developed vulnerable, thus 
increasing the inter-country developmental gap. His perception was influenced by 
Alexander Hamilton’s American school12, developed by the president of the United 
States, John Quincy Adams and senator Henry Clay into the American system – an 
economic plan to support the US domestic industries development by providing 
the necessary physical and financial infrastructure, as well as by protecting them 
from foreign competitors through tariff barriers. Hamilton, the first US Secretary 
11 In the case of Japan, the high growth period is believed to have taken place from the 1950 s, until 
early 1980 s. In the case of Korea, this is counted roughly from the mid-1960 s until early 1990 s.
12 A. Hamilton, The Revolutionary Writings of Alexander Hamilton, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 2008.
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of Treasury, believed that those state interventions and protectionist measures are 
necessary for overall socio-economic development.
The second half of the nineteenth century was marked by the enforcement of 
the Listian political economy into the systemic arrangements in continental Western 
Europe and thus by creation of what perhaps can be seen as initial institutional funda-
mentals for what would later become a developmental state. Its origins can be traced 
from the institutional arrangements of Bismarck’s Prussia and the Meiji restoration 
in Japan13. This model denied the capitalist class the dominant role in development, 
entrusting the guiding of the process of socio-economic development to the state. 
The state elite, supported by effective state bureaucracy, would guide the process of 
the industrialisation of national economies. It was consistent, to some extent, with the 
perception prevalent after the Great Depression until the late 1970 s and motivated 
by the Keynesian theory, that the role of the state or the public sector is crucial in the 
developmental endeavour, especially among underdeveloped countries.
In the mid twentieth century, when Western countries, comprising predominantly 
of Western Europe and North America, distanced the rest of the world in terms of 
the level of development and continued to rely on what evolved from the model of 
capitalist development and the Prussian interventionist state, and, at the same time, 
Eastern Europe was coerced into adopting the state-command economic system, 
the so-called developing countries, many of which were emerging from colonial-
ism, were in desperate need for a developmental model to enable significantly better 
developmental dynamics in order to establish a sound trajectory of “catching up”.
By the end of the twentieth century, among the most successful late developers 
were those countries who became developmental states, i.e. South Korea, Taiwan 
and Singapore, as well as Japan – considered a prime example of the developmental 
state model, despite a rather “early” start to “late development”.
The East Asian case
The concept of the developmental state is often believed to be the institutional 
explanation for the East Asian industrialisation. Ha-Joon Chang, however, points 
out that there is no unambiguous definition of the industrial policy (IP) and that 
the term is often used in reference to too narrow a spectrum of economic activity, 
namely, the state subsidies policy, or too broad a spectrum, namely, any economic 
13 The Meiji restoration (1868–1912) was the process of significant changes in Japan’s political, social 
and economic structures, which accelerated the country’s industrialisation.
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activity related to industry14. Indeed, Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz claim that industrial 
policy ‘comprises policies affecting “infant industry” support of various kinds, but 
also trade policies, science and technology policies, public procurement, policies 
affecting foreign direct investments, intellectual property rights, and the allocation 
of financial resources. [They conclude that] industrial policies, in this broad sense, 
come together with processes of “institutional engineering” shaping the very nature 
of the economic actors, the market mechanisms and rules under which they oper-
ate, and the boundaries between what is governed by market interactions, and what 
is not’15. Rodrik sees industrial policies as ‘policies that stimulate specific economic 
activities and promote structural change, thus, are not [exclusively] about industry 
per se’16. However, for Lindbeck those policies do not involve monetary and fiscal 
measures17. For Haggard (2004, p.64) industrial policies comprise ‘selective interven-
tions designed to influence the allocation of resources among different activities’18. 
‘When we talk about “industrial policy”, the majority of us do not mean any policy 
that affects industry [but] “selective industrial policy” or “targeting” – namely, 
a policy that deliberately favours particular industries over others, against market 
signals, usually to enhance efficiency and promote productivity growth’19. “Against 
market signals” is the cause of the debate between proponents and opponents of the 
applicability of industrial policy as a developmental tool, in other words, whether 
industrial policy actually matters. ‘The traditional rationale for selective industrial 
policy (i.e. policies intended to promote specific industries as against general policies 
to promote industrialisation) has been made in terms of “market failures” that arise 
when competitive markets either do not exist or are incomplete, in situations, for 
example, when there are information asymmetries, scale economies, or externali-
ties’20. Its opponents question the correlation between the policies and the dynamics 
14 H.-J. Chang, The Economic Theory of the Developmental State, in: The Developmental State, ed. 
M. Woo-Cumings, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1999, p. 182–199.
15 M. Cimoli, G. Dosi, J. E. Stiglitz, The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation: The Past and 
Future of Policies for Industrial Development, in: Industrial Policy and Development: The Political Economy 
of Capabilities Accumulation, eds. M. Cimoli et al., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, p. 1–2.
16 D. Rodrik, Normalizing Industrial Policy, Paper prepared for the Commission on Growth and 
Development, 2007, p. 3.
17 A. Lindbeck, Industrial Policy as an Issue in the Economic Environment, “World Economy” 1981, 
no. 4, p. 391–405.
18 S. Haggard, Institutions and Growth in East Asia, “Studies in Comparative International Develop-
ment” 2004, no. 38 (4), p. 64.
19 H.-J. Chang, Industrial Policy: Can We Go Beyond an Unproductive Confrontation?, A Plenary Paper 
for ABCDE Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2009, 22–24 June 2009, p. 2.
20 I. ul Haque, Rethinking Industrial Policy, “UNCTAD Discussion Papers” 2007, no. 183, p. 3.
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of economic growth21. Their objections concern the effectiveness of governments 
addressing the market imperfections and constructing adequate counter policies, 
and the governments’ ability to eliminate rent seeking and corruption associated 
with industrial policy22. Its proponents claim that ‘industrial policies [are] intrinsic 
fundamental ingredients of all development processes’23, despite their shortcom-
ings. Graham claims that industrial policy opponents misread the history and that 
industrial policy has always been present in some forms, even in the United States 
during Reagan’s deregulation period24.
There is a plethora of literature on industrial policy, its features, history and ap-
plicability. Initially, the justification for industrial policy would come from the percep-
tion that market forces are incapable of structural change of the economy necessary 
in the process of socio-economic development. ‘Development is fundamentally about 
the structural change: it involves producing new goods with new technologies and 
transferring resources from traditional activities to new ones. […] Poor countries 
remain poor because markets do not work as well as they could to foster the structural 
transformation that is needed’25. Therefore ‘there was broad consensus around the basic 
assumption that development required [a] non-marginal change that market forces 
alone could not generate’26. Chang points out that the history of rapid development 
of currently affluent states is dotted with interventionist practices framed within the 
industrial policy, since the eighteenth century27. However, a “neoclassical backlash” 
21 See: P. Krugman, Targeted Industrial Policy: Theory and Evidence, “Industrial Change and Public 
Policy” 1983, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City; H. Pack, K. Saggi, The Case for Industrial 
Policy: A Critical Survey, “World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series” 2006, no. 3839; J. Page, The 
East Asian Miracle: Four Lessons for Development Policy, “NBER Macroeconomics Annual” 1994, vol. 9, 
eds. S. Fischer, J. J. Rotemberg, MIT Press, p. 219–282; D. P. Quinn, R. Jacobson, Industrial Policy through 
the Restriction of Capital Flows: A Test of Several Claims Made about Industrial Policy, “American Journal 
of Political Science” 1989, no. 33 (3), p. 700–736; W. T. Woo, The Changing Ingredients in Industrial Policy 
for Economic Growth, Paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network (ARTNeT) 
Symposium Towards a Return of Industrial Policy? 2011, 25–26 July, ESCAP, Bangkok; World Bank, The 
East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, World Bank, Washington DC 1993.
22 D. Rodrik, op.cit.
23 M. Cimoli, G. Dosi, J. E. Stiglitz, op.cit. See also: A. H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea 
and Late Industrialisation, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1989; H.-J. Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder. 
Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, Anthem Press, London 2002; D. Rodrik, Industrial Policy: 
Don’t Ask Why, Ask How, “Middle East Development Journal” 2008, no. 1(1), p. 1–29; R. Wade, Gover­
ning the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 1990; Enlarging Europe: The Industrial Foundations of a New Political Reality, 
eds. J. Zysman, A. Schwartz, University of California, Berkeley 1998; American Industry in International 
Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies, eds. J. Zysman, L. Tyson, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca–London 1983.
24 O. L. Graham, Losing Time: The Industrial Policy Debate, Harvard University Press, Harvard 1992.
25 D. Rodrik, Normalizing…, op.cit., p. 6–7.
26 H. Shapiro, Industrial Policy and Growth, “DESA Working Paper” 2007, no. 53, p. 2.
27 H.-J. Chang, Industrial Policy: Can We Go..., op.cit.
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resulted in the industrial policy being questioned as to its developmental role, as its 
application was allegedly linked to poor economic performance. Although neo-liberal 
economic doctrine is in retreat, ‘the context for the design of industrial policy has 
profoundly changed as a result of new rules governing international trade, the rise 
of global value chains and marketing networks, and other aspects of globalisation’28.
Most of the recent scholarly literature on industrial policy is associated with the 
rapid development of East Asian states. Socio-economic regional advancements of 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have been closely linked not merely in the context of wild-
geese-flying pattern29, but also due to the long-term political and economic interaction, 
particularly intense during the Japanese colonialism30. As far as industrialisation is 
concerned, the East Asian states are often portrayed against Latin American coun-
tries, the latter believed to be the first developing nations to industrialise. The main 
difference between the two regions is usually framed within the debate on outward 
(i.e. export driven) and inward (i.e. domestic consumption driven) industrialisation 
in East Asia and Latin America, respectively. However, according to Chang, the East 
Asian type of industrial policy involves ‘a lot more than handing out subsidies and 
providing trade protectionism (e.g., tariffs, import bans, quotas, domestic regula-
tions at least partially intended to curb imports). According to him, industrial policy 
measures in East Asia included:
 – coordination of complementary investments (the so-called Big Push) and compet-
ing investments through entry regulation, “investment cartels”, and (in declining 
industries) negotiated capacity cuts;
 – policies to ensure scale economies (e.g., licensing conditional upon production 
scale, emphasis on the infant industries starting to export from early on, state-
mediated mergers and acquisitions);
 – regulation on technology imports (e.g., screening for overly obsolete technologies, 
cap on technology licensing royalties), when the state acts as a venture capitalist 
and an incubator for high-tech firms;
 – regulation on foreign direct investment (e.g., entry and ownership restrictions, local 
contents requirement, technology transfer requirements, export requirements);
28 I. ul Haque, Rethinking Industrial Policy, “Discussion Papers United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development” 2007, no. 183, p. 1.
29 K. Akamatsu, A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing Countries, “Journal of Devel-
oping Economies” 1962, no. 1 (1), p. 3–25.
30 B. Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy. Industrial 
Sectors, Product Cycles and Political Consequences, “International Organization” 1984, no. 38 (1), p. 1–40; 
R. F. Doner, B. K. Ritchie, D. Slater, Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: North-
east and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective, “International 327 Organization” 2005, no. 59, p. 361; 
A. Kohli, Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s, Deve-
lopmental State, “World Development” 1994, no. 22 (9), p. 1269–1293; R. Wade, op.cit.
17The East Asian industrial policy: a critical analysis of the developmental state
nr 2(2)2014
 – export promotion (e.g., export subsidies, export loan guarantees, marketing help 
from the state trading agency);
 – government allocation of foreign exchanges, with top priority going to capital 
goods imports (especially for export industries) and the bottom priority to luxury 
consumption good imports31.
In his “classic” work on Japanese industrialisation, entitled MITI and the Japanese 
Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, Johnson distinguished two basic 
components of the industrial policy in Japan, corresponding to micro and macro 
aspects of the economy; the first – industrial rationalisation policy, and the second 
– industrial structure policy. ‘Industrial rationalisation means: (1) the rationalisation 
of enterprises, that is, the adoption of new techniques of production, investment 
in new equipment and facilities, quality control, cost reduction, adoption of new 
management techniques, and the perfection of managerial control; (2) the rationalisa-
tion of the environment of enterprises, including land and water transportation and 
industrial location; (3) the rationalisation of whole industries, meaning the creation 
of a framework for all enterprises in an industry in which each can compete fairly or 
in which they can cooperate in a cartel-like arrangement of mutual assistance; and 
(4) the rationalisation of the industrial structure itself in order to meet international 
competitive standards’.32 Industrial structure policy ‘concerns the proportions of 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and services in the nation’s total production; 
and within manufacturing it concerns the percentages of light and heavy and of 
labour-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries. The application of the policy 
comes in the government’s attempts to change these proportions in ways it deems 
advantageous to the nation. […] The heart of the policy is the selection of the strategic 
industries to be developed or converted to other lines of work’33. Kagami underlines 
that throughout the period of Japan’s rapid growth there were many IP definitions, 
which appeared in the scholarly literature, ranging from all MITI34 activities, via most 
policies intervening into the national industry, to selective actions within certain 
industries35. He focuses his IP analysis on market limitations as the main reason 
to implement industrial policies, and following Goto and Idre he divides them into: 
traditional and recently added market failures, and market imperfections. He pays 
31 H.-J. Chang, Industrial Policy: Can We Go…, op.cit., p. 3.
32 Ch. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford 1982, p. 27.
33 Ibidem, p. 28.
34 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan (1949–2001) is considered to have been 
one of the most influential and powerful governmental agencies in the Japanese government structure.
35 M. Kagami, The Role of Industrial Policy: Japan’s Experience, “Revista de Economia Politica” 1995, 
no. 15 (1), p. 119–133.
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special attention to the economy of scale concept (internal and external) and to Mar-
shallian externalities and start-up costs. The “internal” economies of scale concern 
the decreasing cost of production per unit with the increasing volume of production 
and with the accumulated knowledge of workers (so-called dynamic economies of 
scale). ‘The “external” economies of scale mean that the average production cost 
in related industries declines in proportion to a production expansion in the main 
industry’36, for example, in the case of “network effects” or “Marshallian externali-
ties”, when improvements in the main industry trigger improvements in related in-
dustries thanks to knowledge dissemination. Kim in his analysis of Korea considers 
industrial policy to be ‘all government policy measures that are aimed at promoting 
the development of [national] industry’37. However, he distinguishes between those 
industrial promotional measures, which exert an economy-wide impact and those 
– industry-specific.
The general approach to industrialisation in developmental states is concerned, 
firstly, with import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and then, with export-orien-
tated industrialisation (EOI). This industrialisation starts with import-substitution 
industrialisation, where a state gradually replaces imported goods with domestically 
manufactured products. According to Haggard, ‘ISI may occur “naturally” as the result 
of balance-of-payments problems, supply interruptions associated with wars or growth 
of the domestic market. ISI is advanced, however, by policies to manage balance-of-
payments crises, particularly trade and exchange controls, and by explicit industrial 
policies designed to raise the rate of return to manufacturing’38. Haggard distinguishes 
three phases of ISI. ‘In the first stage, the state earnings come from primary-product 
exports and the foreign borrowing finance the imports of selected producer goods. 
These imports provide the foundation for local manufacturing’39. In its second stage, 
the dependency on raw material and food exports as well as on foreign borrowing is 
maintained, ‘since investment in new industrial capacity increases the demand for 
imported capital and intermediate goods’40. The third phase is characterised by the 
supplementing of import substitution with the expansion of manufactured exports. 
Thus, ISI gradually moves towards export-oriented industrialisation or EOI. The EOI 
would create a structural relation of a developmental state with the world economy41, 
in which the world economy would become the market for the national production, 
36 Ibidem, p. 121.
37 K. S. Kim, Industrial Policy and Industrialization in South Korea: 1961–1982 – Lessons on Industrial 
Policies for Other Developing Countries, “Kellogg Institute Working Paper” 1985, no. 39, p. 16.
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excessive to the domestic consumption capacities. Another important DS policy 
aspect concerns industrial upgrading, i.e. a gradual and continuous change of the 
assortment of industrial production towards higher sophistication and technological 
advancement. According to Bernard and Ravenhill industrial upgrading was the key 
issue for East Asian developmental states42.
Learning and innovating
The initial phase of industrialisation ‘has come about as a process of learning 
rather than of generation of inventions and innovations’43, as the late developers were 
in the position to “borrow” existing technologies44. Therefore, the industrial targeting 
would need to be primarily focused on those industries, who would contribute to the 
broad strategy of the overall catching up, rather than single out exclusively sectors 
associated with advanced technologies. These industries would usually possess the 
potential of their products becoming widely desirable on the international market.
In practice, preferential treatment of what would be adequately technologically-
advanced production became an important feature of the East Asian industrial policy 
and indigenous innovation has been a vital element of the East Asian developmental 
model. Adequate levels of innovation would be achieved via investment in R&D and/or 
import of technologies. The quality of R&D could be achieved through the attraction 
of foreign specialists and experts, as well as foreign technologies, in the short term, 
whereas long-term effects would be achieved via the creation of a local intellectual 
base composed of scientists and engineers. This would necessitate a constant nur-
turing of human capital formation via the expansion of the training base/facilities.
Although Japan is considered to belong to the “late developers” group, hence 
the initial process of innovation would suggest an importation and duplication of 
technologies, Japan’s rather early developmental start in the late developers group, as 
well as a general lack of a generic Asian policy of major FDI attraction, suggest that 
throughout the high growth period Japan, to some important extent, relied on its own 
R&D. Indeed, already at the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan’s expansion 
in cotton textile production was attributed to the utilisation of new technologies and 
adequate managerial coordination based on indigenous experiences and patterns. Mass 
42 M. Bernard, J. Ravenhill, Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy, and 
the Industrialization of East Asia, “World Politics” 1995, no. 47 (2), p. 171–209.
43 A. H. Amsden, op.cit., p. 4.
44 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge 1962.
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and Miyajima point to the establishment of experimental industrial laboratories aimed 
initially at developing new technologies in the textile industries, as far as dyeing of 
material is concerned, as an example of R&D orientation45. This policy, as well as the 
earlier efforts of the Meiji’s administration focused on the development of educational 
base resulted in a very high position of Japan in ranking of the Human Capital Index 
even among developed nations. The subsequent “targeting” of industries for develop-
ment took into consideration the advantages of becoming innovative; hence offering 
technologically more advanced products. This is not to say that Japan refrained itself 
from importing necessary technologies. On the contrary, the American companies 
were especially targeted for the transfer of technology. Initially, ‘Japan imported […] 
technology for its basic and high-growth industries, and imported the greater pro-
portion of this technology from the United States’46. The government was in charge 
of technology transfers and no technology would enter the country without MITI’s 
approval. Based on Foreign Capital and Foreign Exchange Control Law, ‘the Japanese 
government allocated its scarce foreign currency selectively to those firms capable of 
adapting and improving import technology, in order to encourage the importation 
of advanced technology and to promote a domestic technology base’47. Subsequently, 
‘technological development was supported by direct and indirect production and 
R&D subsidies, the encouragement of multifirm research consortia, the discourage-
ment of foreign direct investment in sectors in which it was technologically feasible 
for Japan to enter’48. The proof of a strong R&D base was delivered during the early 
1970 s when Japan commenced reorganisation of its industrial sector towards future 
promising branches such as computer industry and electronics. As a result, by late 
1970 s, Japan became the world leader in semiconductor technology, following the 
MITI’s vision of “technology-based nation”.
Korea found itself in favourable conditions as far as the process of learning and in-
novating is concerned. In the early twentieth century, the state was seen by its coloniser 
– Japan as an important supply base for further Japanese expansion in Asia, hence the 
development of the country was viewed by the Japanese as crucial. This is why Korea’s 
rapid and extensive industrialisation commenced under the Japanese rule. The first 
45 W. Mass, H. Miyajima, The Organization of the Developmental State: Fostering Private Capabilities 
and the Roots of the Japanese “Miracle”, “Business and Economic History” 1993, no. 22 (1), p. 151–168.
46 Ch. Johnson, op.cit., p. 16.
47 M. Sakakibara, D.-S. Cho, Cooperative R&D in Japan and Korea: A Comparison of Industrial Policy, 
“Research Policy” 2002, no. 31 (5), p. 678.
48 M. Noland, From Industrial Policy to Innovation Policy: Japan’s Pursuit of Competitive Advantage, 
“Asian Economic Policy Review” 2007, no. 2, p. 255.
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Korean companies49 derived their innovation from imitating the Japanese firms and 
from heavily relying on transfer of technology from Japan. During the high growth 
period of the 1960 s and 1970 s, Korea continued to rely on foreign technologies for 
its industries, partly benefiting from the US overall assistance. Nevertheless, in the 
early 1980 s the government commenced the reorganisation of development trajectory 
into knowledge- and information-intensive industries, in which local R&D would 
play a crucial role. By Cho et al. this period is called “creative knowledge intensive 
era”50. The alleged initial low position in rankings on the Human Capital Index re-
sulted in Korea’s government paying more attention to the education of scientists and 
engineers. Chun points out that science-profiled high schools were for that reason 
supervised by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy and not by the Min-
istry of Education51. As early as in the 1960 s, the government established the Korea 
Institute of Science and Technology responsible for developing industrial technology 
and the Korea Development Institute for conducting research on development policy. 
Foreign specialists were continuously attracted via income and career-development 
incentives. Korea became a good example of effective human capital accumulation.
The targeting
Certain industrial sectors were deliberately targeted by the state for develop-
ment, due to their real or potential value for the national economy. During the high 
growth period, Japanese government’s targeting encompassed various sectors. In the 
early days, the priority was given to production of coal, iron and steel, as a part of 
the “priority production programme”. It should be seen as the continuation of the 
pre-war heavy industry development focused then on the military equipment, which 
would accompany the expansion of textile production from the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Later, the focus also included electric power building and shipbuilding, as well 
as petrochemicals to produce synthetic fibre and chemical fertiliser, among others. 
According to Cumings, this assortment of targeting represented the second phase 
49 The companies set up in Korea were initially the Japanese zaibatsu such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi. 
Both companies became keiretsu after world war two. See: R. Morck, M. Nakamura, The History of Cor-
porate Ownership in Japan, “ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance” 2003, no. 20.
50 D.-S. Cho, D.-H. Lee, S.-J. Ryu, D.-W. Cho, D.-J. Kim, Comparative Study of Korean and Japanese 
Industrial Policies Though Content Analysis of Official Documents, “Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce 
and Management” 1996, no. 31 (1), p. 59–74.
51 See: S.-H. Chun, Economic Development, and Tax Policy and Tax System in Korea, “Research Paper”, 
Korea Institute of Public Finance, Seoul 2002. For the analysis of the importance of the R&D during 
Korea’s industrialisation, see: A. H. Amsden, op.cit.
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of Japan’s industrialisation, which commenced in the 1930 s and was completed by 
the mid-1960 s52. The late 1940 s efforts were mainly focused on reconstruction of 
pre-war industrial sectors, whereas the theme of the 1950 s industrialisation became 
the industrial catching-up. A similar recovery after the Korean war determined the 
initial targeting policies of the South Korean government, which included cement 
and glass as well as refined oil products. Nevertheless, attention was directed shortly 
afterwards towards light industry.
In the 1960 s, the Japanese government continued promoting heavy as well as 
chemical industries (HCI). Heavy industry remained strategic at least until 1970.53 
However, more focus was directed towards machinery and automobile industry. 
Although the Korean government also started paying more attention to heavy and 
chemical industries, as a potential export orientated production, nevertheless, the 
production was dominated by the light industry, including textiles.
In the 1970 s the Japanese targeting focused on machine productions and elec-
tronic industries, including computer industry. Undoubtedly, it was partly caused 
by the 1973 oil shock, as a result of which a number of energy-intensive industries 
such as aluminium, chemicals, and steel, found themselves in decline. Despite that, 
in 1973 Park Chung Hee announced its strategy of heavy-chemical industrialisation 
in Korea54. HCI became a priority sector. As much as in Japan during the 1950 s, the 
production of iron, steel, petrochemicals and non-ferrous metals became strategically 
important. The government also promoted the construction of shipyards.
From the late 1970 s, high-tech products became the main target for the Japanese 
government’s preferential treatment and the governmental support for R&D increased. 
In the late 1970 s the Koreans accelerated the development of heavy and chemical 
industries, with the emphasis on industrial machinery, steel and electric equipment, 
whereas in the 1980 s, similar to Japan, redirected its attention to knowledge- and 
information-intensive industries. The change from labour intensive to knowledge 
intensive industries in both cases was also dictated by the rapidly increasing cost of 
labour. Needless to say, the targeting of industries was consequently reflected in the 
assortments of export goods.
52 B. Cumings, op.cit., p. 2.
53 Y. Kobayashi, The Role and Significance of Japanese Industrial Policy: Its Estimation and Recent 
Issue, “Economic Journal of Hokkaido University” 1993, no. 22, p. 81.
54 J.-G. Jeon, Exploring the Three Varieties of East Asia’s State-Guided Development Model: Korea, 
Signapore, and Taiwan, “Studies in Comparative International Development” 1995, no. 30 (3), p. 74.
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The trade policy
All the East Asian fast developers prove that export was an important drive behind 
the fast socio-economic development. The trade policy would involve the establish-
ment of barriers for import and incentives for export. The import substitution indus-
trialisation (ISI) would include import barriers. Export orientated industrialisation 
(EOI) would involve export promotion. In Japan, the strategy was already present 
in the years 1914–1938, when the state became a world leading textile exporter. The 
cartelisation process was accompanied by increased import tariffs and anti-dumping 
laws. After world war two, Japan followed a similar path. Up until 1975 it was domes-
tic consumption, and thus ISI, which drove its economic growth. All international 
trade was under government’s direct control (until the early 1950 s). Later, two factors 
caused the steady climb of average trade tariffs rate, namely; gradual reduction of tariff 
exemption for machinery and the increase in tariffs on food imports. For example, 
sugar customs duties hiked from 15% in 1951 to 100% in 195955. Import substitution 
production was additionally enhanced via the exercising of strict control over import, 
mostly via quota systems, where in the 1960 s almost 500 types of goods were under 
the import quota system, including steel products (as early as in 1950). Economic 
liberalisation moved Japan closer to an EOI pattern. However, this liberalisation fo-
cused on eliminating quota-style quantitative restrictions, whereas tariffs continued 
to be important tools in restraining imports. The agreements brokered during the 
GATT’s Kennedy Round (1964–1967) effected a gradual decrease in Japanese tariffs 
from the late 1960 s. In the early 1970 s, the government implemented a number 
of effective tariff reductions on mining and manufacturing products, as well as on 
agricultural goods. In the late 1970 s, the measures to prevent import and promote 
export were gradually eliminated, whereas in the early 1980 s the policy of import 
promotion took place, in order to balance the Japanese trade surplus.
‘Until the late 1950 s, Korea was a typical inward-orientated economy’56. Soon 
after the Park Chung Hee took over power, the EOI became the dominant focus. The 
government introduced various export incentives. Nevertheless, export, was closely 
monitored, to the extent that the decisions on the product type, the exporter and 
the targeted market were greatly influenced by the state administration. Moreover, 
55 I. Yamazawa, Trade Policy and Changes in Japan’s Trade Structure – With Special Reference to Labour- 
-Intensive Manufactures, “The Developing Economies” 1975, no. 386.
56 Ch.-H. Nam, The Role of Trade and Exchange Rate Policy in Korea’s Growth, in: Growth Theories 
in Light of the East Asian Experience, eds. T. Ito, A. Krueger, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1995, 
p. 154.
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the ‘Ministry of Commerce and Industry set annual export targets for officials con-
nected with export administration’57. At the same time, protection of the domestic 
market played an important role. The government tightened import control, while 
the general import tariffs rose to 40%. The tariffs diversification and tariffs exemp-
tions allowed the government to steer the inflow of goods and capital. For example, 
intermediate goods for export production and some capital goods for special uses or 
specific industries were imported duty free. Imposed import quotas were awarded 
to companies proportionally, according to their export volume (the export-import 
link). Although the first attempts at import liberalisation took place already in the 
late 1960 s, the effective policy took shape in the 1980 s. 
The subsidies
To nurture the development of certain industries, as well as to boost export, the 
state policy would involve the direct and indirect channelling of financial assistance 
via banks or state institutions in the form of credit subsidies and other subsidies, 
regulatory actions such as domestic tax policies and price control mechanisms, as 
well as monetary policies such as the manipulation of interest rates and exchange 
rates. All those policies are sometimes classified as subsidies related.
Banks have realised a policy of indirect subsidies offering preferential rate loans 
for designated sectors and designated enterprises. These were usually described as 
policy loans or subsidised general loans. The mechanism was based on subsidised 
interest rates, and the market distortion in Korea became so significant that export 
loans had negative real interest rates. Woo distinguished three ways of generating 
policy loans in Korea – from the banking system, the fiscal-type taken out of the 
state budget, and from the National Investment Fund (since 1973)58. In the 1970 s 
policy loans accounted for over 40% of domestic credit. Preferential loans were ini-
tially granted for the textile industries and later – for export and all the HCI sectors, 
including transport infrastructure, energy and defence. In Japan, ‘capital channelling 
to preferred sectors was implemented through direct subsidies, indirect subsidies 
through state-owned or dominated banks, and preferential tax breaks such as ac-
celerated depreciation on investment’59. Policy loans mostly benefited the targeted 
industries – iron and steel production, electric power and shipbuilding. A direct 
57 K. S. Kim, op.cit., p. 30.
58 J.-E. Woo, Race to the Swift: The Role of Finance in Korean Industrialization, Columbia University 
Press, New York 1991.
59 M. Noland, op.cit., p. 255.
25The East Asian industrial policy: a critical analysis of the developmental state
nr 2(2)2014
credit allocation to selected industries on concessional terms was supplemented by 
governmental direct subsidies.
Direct subsidies featured already in Japan for the designated textile production 
industry. The Japanese government used the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme 
in the endeavour of selective investment in targeted sectors and enterprises, whereas 
in Korea this role was fulfilled by the National Investment Fund. In Japan, the 
initial purpose of the direct allocation of foreign reserves was to purchase foreign 
technologies. It is important to emphasise that the preferential policy of direct and 
indirect subsidies was not only directed at targeted industries, but also – at particular 
enterprises. In Korea, especially during the HCI targeting, the subsidies were given 
to certain enterprises, who managed to gain favour from Park Chung Hee.
These subsidies also took the form of various tax subsidies. In general, tax policies, 
meaning favourable treatment for certain activities, i.e. lower taxes, tax deductions, 
tax exemptions and special depreciation for tax purposes, were all used towards 
targeted sectors and enterprises in the case of Japan and Korea. In the 1950 s the 
Japanese government introduced various tax incentive policies for industrial devel-
opment, as well as export development, namely, special depreciation (1951), import 
tax exemption for import of machinery (1952), export-import link tax reduction 
(1953). The fiscal policies served to attract modern technology. “Inclined taxation 
system” provided generous corporate tax exemption arrangements in purchasing 
specific types of machinery and equipment, and accelerated the introduction of 
foreign technologies60. In Korea, ‘the 1961 Tax Exemption and Reduction Control 
Law began to provide export firms with tax deduction measures’61. The subsequent 
policies focused on tax exemptions and tax deductions, as well as accelerated tax 
depreciation on profits from export activities, in targeted HCI such as steel, chemical, 
shipbuilding and machinery, and eventually in 1982 – on R&D related activities62.
60 F. Kimura, Japan’s Model of Economic Development: Relevant and Nonrelevant Elements for Develo-
ping Economies, “WIDER Working Paper” 2009, no. 22.
61 J. S. Mah, Export Promotion Policies, Export Composition and Economic Development of Korea, Paper 
prepared for the Law and Development Institute Inaugural Conference, Sydney 2010, p. 8.
62 See: S. Haggard, R. N. Cooper, S. Collins, Ch. Kim, S.-T. Ro, Macroeconomic Policy and Adjustment 
in Korea, 1970–1990, “Harvard Studies in International Development”, Harvard Institute for International 
Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1994; Ch.-H. Nam, op.cit.
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∗  ∗  ∗
The contemporary applicability?
The above analysis leads us to the question of possible scenarios as far as the 
contemporary applicability of the concept of the developmental state is concerned. 
Is there space for it to be applied in the times of globalisation? Can any state benefit 
from it? How far can state intervention go? The concept is often seen as merely a his-
torical phenomenon, which brought extensive developmental achievements in very 
specific exogenic and endogenic conditions. It would thus be naïve to believe that 
all its provisions can be transplanted into systemic arrangements of underdeveloped 
countries contemporarily. However, there are undoubtedly some lessons to be learned.
The question of DS contemporary applicability is inevitably connected with the 
discussion on the positioning of the state and state interventionism in the times of 
globalisation. The gradual disappearance of regulatory barriers in economic interac-
tions between the states, the regions and the economic sectors seems to be advancing. 
However, some barriers disappear, but in their place new mechanisms of protection 
are created. It is a popular opinion that the new rules favour strong entities within 
the global economy and marginalise the weak ones, including developing countries. 
Consequently, the dismissal of a scenario in which the role of the state will still be 
crucial, upon the conviction that a one borderless global economy is rapidly emerg-
ing, seems premature. On the contrary, the role of the state will most likely remain 
extremely important to fend the national interests, as the 2008/2009 financial crisis 
clearly illustrates, allowing space for the possible utilisation of the provisions of the 
DS model.
The actual process of globalisation has left many nations and a plethora of social 
groups dissatisfied. The development-related disparities are increasing. Although 
some manage to accumulate significant wealth, the majority remains only marginally 
better off. Again, this is because ‘a more aggressively enforced internationalisation of 
the global economy, [has been] built around rules that work primarily to the benefit 
of current holders of financial capital’63. In this situation, only states are believed 
to offer adequate political resources to avert and redirect the process to make it 
more socially equitable, and the nations seem prone to turn towards interventionist 
practices to achieve better developmental dynamics.
63 P. Evans, Transferable Lessons? Re-Examining the Institutional Prerequisites of East Asian Economic 
Policies, “Journal of Development Studies” 1998, no. 34 (6), p. 82.
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Naturally, globalisation, understood as a multilevel integration of national and 
regional economies and as a growth of interdependence of various socio-economic 
processes worldwide, will most likely continue in one form or another and the pres-
sure of the external economic environment to influence the processes internally, 
will continue to take place. This is what constitutes the predicament of “late-late” 
development, as described by Beeson64. Therefore, state needs to play an important 
role in poor countries, who require better developmental dynamics, by attempting 
to benefit from international conditionality (e.g. from trade liberalisation, from easier 
technology diffusion) and by resisting external threats (such as attempts by foreign 
economic agents/actors to overtake certain domestic industrial sectors in order 
to eliminate possible competition).
Moreover, in view of relatively recent East Asian economic achievements and 
the lack thereof in other regions, the necessity for creating developmental states can-
not be easily dismissed. In reality, we are clearly observing DS features being more 
prominent in contemporary policy making. The governments are becoming less shy 
to speak about interventionism and regulation to nurture development. Even places 
considered to be the bastions of the neo-liberalism thought implementation seem 
to be giving in. International organisations such as the OECD have begun admitting 
the successes of the developmental state model.
Institutional arrangements enabling state-guided development, policy solutions 
focusing on industrial development and a selective engagement with the global 
economy and state ideology defending national economic interests can all, in one 
way or another, be considered for a broader audience. The process of rejection of 
neo-liberalism is accompanied by an increase in the interest in a variation of the 
DS arrangements in other continents than Asia. It is interesting to see how the DS 
model becomes more prominent in Africa. The continent is seen as the new high 
growth region, with challenges similar to those faced earlier by East Asian economies, 
mostly related to a large incidence of poverty. It is then by all means natural that 
the discussion on adequate development models therein also includes that which 
brought the biggest successes in the second half of the twentieth century. The idea 
of constructing an African developmental state has floated around at least since the 
1990 s65 and is indeed believed to have peaked in the twenty first century. Due to its 
authoritarian political arrangements and high growth, Ethiopia is often mentioned 
64 M. Beeson, The Rise and Fall (?) of the Developmental State: The Vicissitudes and Implications of East 
Asian Interventionism, in: Developmental States: Relevancy Redundancy or Reconfiguration?, ed. L. Low, 
Nova Science Publishers, New York 2004.
65 T. Mkandawire, Thinking about Developmental States in Africa, “Cambridge Journal of Economics” 
2001, no. 25 (3), p. 289–313.
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as a possible example66. However, as many countries on the continent have been 
undergoing democratisation processes, the African developmental state has been 
connected with the constructing of a democratic developmental state 67.
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